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earlier. The fact that the former are not
as easily listed as the latter demonstrates
that Novo and Parker are offering morecomplex and -nuanced lessons than
those they replaced. Aside from these big
takeaways, the book has some smaller
but no less compelling ideas. Specifically,
Novo and Parker point out that, despite
what Archidamus, king of Sparta,
and Pericles, “first citizen” of Athens,
repeatedly say (and what the Naval War
College repeatedly teaches), navies were
far easier to replace than armies (p. 75).
They also quite persuasively dispute the
Sicilian expedition’s similarities to the
Vietnam War (pp. 37–38, 147), another
long-standing Naval War College truism.
Unfortunately, the authors sometimes
are guilty of the very sins they catalog.
First, some of their myth busting seems
more like hair splitting. For example,
they point out that Athens was not a
sea power because “strictly speaking,
as a metropolitan area” Athens lacked
access to the sea (p. 102)—but surely a
distance of six miles from acropolis to
port does not dictate disqualification as
a sea power. Second, they take several
incidents out of context, or they ascribe
links between events that just are not
present in Thucydides. For example,
they imply that Thucydides was shocked
that Sparta did not break the Peace of
Nicias after Melos was reduced, but
the quote they cite describes Spartan
reaction (or lack thereof) to Athenian
raids in the Peloponnesus (p. 115), not
the sack of Melos. Finally, on several
occasions they mischaracterize secondary sources as representing Thucydides,
or speeches from Thucydides as the
author’s own views (p. 83). The end
result is that rather than add nuance to
an oversimplified claim such as “fifthcentury Greece was bipolar,” they merely
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replace it with an equally oversimplified
claim such as “fifth-century Greece was
not bipolar,” despite having presented
many diverse and compelling points
of view that fifth-century Greece was a
more complicated state than a simple
label would suggest (pp. 50–53).
I recognize that I may not be the target
audience for this book. I am fluent in
ancient Greek; I have read Thucydides
multiple times, as literature, translation
material, history, and political science;
and I already am familiar with most of
the books and articles the authors cite.
In contrast, for a reader who knows
Thucydides only through Graham
Allison or from pithy misquotations and
misattributions, this book may provide
alternative perspectives. While I agree
with Novo and Parker’s exhortation to
use Thucydides “as a beginning not as an
end” (p. 171), readers who are unfamiliar
with Thucydides but wish to understand
this important work still should approach
Restoring Thucydides with caution.
JOSHUA HAMMOND

On Operations: Operational Art and Military Disciplines, by B. A. Friedman. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2021. 256 pages. $31.95.

On Operations is B. A. Friedman’s examination of the origins of the operational
level of war, operational art, and the
military general staff and of their impact
on U.S. military thinking, doctrine, and
way of war. His ambitious work has two
aims. First, he advocates strongly for the
removal of the concept of the operational
level of war from U.S. doctrine. Second,
he seeks to improve the value and use of
operational art by military staffs in organizing tactical actions to attain strategic
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results. Although the pieces as a whole
are thought provoking for practitioners
and planners, the book suffers from two
notable shortfalls. In his pursuit of the
first aim—removing the operational
level of war from military thinking—he
at times appears to paint theory and
doctrine as excessively dogmatic. In
addressing the second aim—enhancing
the use of operational art—his points,
while persuasive at times, would have
been stronger overall had they provided
further elaboration on the planning
efficacy that would be achieved by using
a paradigm with no operational level.
Friedman organizes his work into
seventeen chapters and provides five case
studies to help illustrate his own theory
of operational art. In his introductory
chapter he meticulously lays out the case
for bifurcating the operational level of
war from operational art, then removing
the operational-level concept from
U.S. military thinking altogether while
retaining operational art. He presents
his evidence against the operational
level first by outlining the arguments
opposing its abolishment. In the five
subsequent chapters he reinforces his
position by covering the historical
origins and application of the operational
level in German, Soviet, and U.S. military
thinking, and discusses the nature of
a healthy civil-military relationship.
Friedman shifts his focus in the
remaining chapters and proffers a set
of principles for operational art by
organizing war-fighting functions into
six disciplines. He dedicates a chapter to
each of the six: administration, information, operations, fire support, logistics,
and command and control. Finally, five
case studies covering Austerlitz, Königgrätz, the Atlantic campaign, the Battle
of Britain, and Operation WATCHTOWER
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(Guadalcanal) are offered to illustrate the
utility of these operational disciplines.
Friedman argues that the concept
of an operational level of war, and
consequently the levels themselves,
has no place in U.S. military thinking
and must be removed. He asserts that
the adoption of the operational level
as part of U.S. doctrine was the result
of a misinterpretation of German and
Soviet operational thought. Further, he
claims that there is an underlying lack
of supporting logic for the purpose of
the operational level as being the link
between tactics and strategy. According
to Friedman, the various definitions
of the operational level are contradictory and nebulous in the literature and
cannot be linked to the long-established
concepts of tactics and strategy. He warns
that the consequences of an operational
level interposed between tactics and
strategy will continue to be damaging
to contemporary military planning.
Friedman advocates strongly for the retention and application of operational art
and for a military general staff to serve
as its executor. According to Friedman,
flawed doctrine and military thinking
have resulted in an incorrect understanding of the operational level and a
resultant conflation of it with operational
art, causing the latter to be marginalized.
He firmly establishes that operational art
has merit once it is separated from the
operational level. He explores the rise of
the military staff in applying operational
art to manage the conduct of war, and
he suggests a modernized version of
the Scharnhorst model of a general
staff as an exemplar. This professional
staff, knowledgeable in the practice of
operational art, capably can support the
commander. It is the general staff and
its application of operational art, not the
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concept of an operational level of war,
that effectively support the tactics-andstrategy dialectic, in turn serving to manage the complexities of modern warfare.
Unfortunately, Friedman’s argument
paints a picture of the concepts underpinning military theory and doctrine as
being static and unchanging. Yet military
theory is not static, and doctrine changes
under the pressures of experience and
critical thinking to provide pragmatic
utility. No theory or doctrine should
be dogmatic, especially in the conduct
of war, and this truism applies to the
concept of the operational level of war
as well. Even though it was wrongly
adopted into doctrine, the concept of
an operational level of war has evolved
beyond its original formulation. In
the absence of addressing directly the
interrelationships among levels, related
objectives, and operational art itself, his
argument is left weaker than it could
have been. As long as there is utility to be
found in applying any concept to create
and execute military plans effectively,
that concept has a purpose in military
thinking and should be retained.
On Operations outlines a way to
understand and manage war. The work is
ambitious and covers significant territory
in roughly two hundred pages. This work
will generate controversy among practitioners of operational planning—who, in
fact, should be challenged to justify the
value and existence of the operationallevel-of-war concept. Friedman’s work
adds to the body of military thinking
about operational art and the operational
level of war. It should appeal to military
staffs, and planners in particular, who
desire to widen their professional
knowledge about operational art and
the theory and doctrine that support it.
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Imperial Twilight: The Opium War and the End of
China’s Last Golden Age, by Stephen R. Platt. New
York: Knopf, 2018. 592 pages. $17.

In modern Chinese history, few subjects
are discussed as widely and misunderstood as broadly as the so-called
Century of Humiliation, which ostensibly commenced with China’s defeat in
the First Opium War (1839–42). Most
academic analyses of the Century of Humiliation’s genesis emphasize economic
and technological disparities, inevitable
clashes of contrasting civilizations, or,
broadly, the tide of European imperialism. Historian Stephen Platt, however,
has sought to examine the prelude
to the Opium War comprehensively
through the eyes of the individuals who
drove early Anglo-Chinese relations.
Imperial Twilight is concerned not with
the Opium War itself but with how it
came to occur. Platt posits two essential
questions along which he aligns his
work. The first examines how Britain
came to fight a war with China for the
sake of merchants who were trafficking
illegal drugs, despite visceral domestic
opposition. The second seeks to
determine how China declined from its
peerless geopolitical position in the eighteenth century and, in turn, how Britain
came to take advantage of that decline.
Within this framework, Platt examines
the early history of Anglo-Chinese trade
and diplomatic relations, beginning with
the establishment of the canton system
in 1759 and ending in the aftermath
of the Opium War. At the same time,
Platt relates the various internal crises
faced by the Qing Empire, from the
White Lotus Rebellion to rampant
piracy in China’s southern littoral.
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